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Abstract:  In this article, the author argues that both wrongful life and wrongful 
birth suits promote attitudes that devalue the lives of people with disabilities.  She 
begins by accounting for the nature and history of wrongful life and 
wrongful birth suits and presents key cases for each kind of suit.  She 
moves on to argue that in wrongful life suits, the plaintiff must claim that 
non-existence is preferable to a life with disabilities.  The defense and 
acceptance of such a claim contribute to the conceptualization of life with 
disability as a personal tragedy.  In the wrongful birth cases analysed by the author, 
parents argue that they would have terminated their pregnancies if 
properly informed of the impairment-related risks.  In light of the parents' 
admission, the author argues that in suits of this nature, the injury to parents is 
the child born, not the deprivation of informed choice. While parents are forced to 
take up the language of harm and burden – language that reinforces ableism – to 
qualify for the financial compensation awarded in wrongful life and wrongful birth 
cases, the responsibility for improving the lives of disabled people should be borne 
by society and taken up as a human rights issue. 
 
 
This article argues that both wrongful life and wrongful birth legal suits promote attitudes that 
devalue the lives of people with disabilities.  I will begin by accounting for the nature and history 
of wrongful life and wrongful birth suits and present key Canadian cases for each kind of suit, as 
well as the literature that critiques such suits.  I then argue that in wrongful life suits, the plaintiff 
must claim that non-existence is preferable to a life with disabilities. The defense and acceptance 
of such a claim contribute to the conceptualization of life with disability as a personal tragedy. In 
wrongful birth cases, parents argue that they would have terminated their pregnancies if properly 
informed of the impairment-related risks. In light of the parents’ admission, I argue that in suits 
of this nature, the injury to parents is the child born, not the deprivation of informed choice. 
Parents are forced to take up the language of harm and burden.  While they must use language 
that reinforces ableism to qualify for the financial compensation awarded in wrongful life and 
wrongful birth cases, the responsibility for improving the lives of disabled people should be 
borne by society and taken up as a human rights issue. 
These suits are important because they promote ableism and have thus drawn the 
attention of disability scholars.  Within disability rights discourse, advocates have been critiquing 
legal approaches to disability because disability is being shaped in problematic ways through the 
decisions made and language used in case law.  Wrongful life and wrongful birth suits are 
contributing to discrimination against persons with disabilities by associating disability with 
harm and by rendering disability a problem for which individuals can seek compensation.  
Disability scholars have taken interest in legal approaches to disability and deserve to have a 
voice at the table.  It is thus of vital importance that legal discourse include the disability critique 
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Literature Review 
My primary research includes case law from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as well as the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  In McDonald-Wright v. O’Herlihy, [2005] CanLII 13806 (On S.C.), 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered the trial jury’s ruling against Audrey McDonald 
and her son Beau, who was born with a neural tube defect.  This case marked the separation of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits; plaintiffs must now establish a separate breach of care for 
each.  When the nature of the harm inflicted on Beau was explored, the plaintiff argued that 
Beau’s claim “is not predicated on the right not to be born” (p. 12).  Instead, the plaintiff was 
arguing that “the wrong consists in a failure to inform Audrey McDonald of Beau’s condition in 
a timely manner in order to allow her to make an appropriate decision.”     
 Brought to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Bovington v. Hergott, [2006] Can LII 
39460 (On. S.C.), involved a wrongful life claim against a physician who failed to disclose the 
risks of taking Clomid, a fertility drug that causes twin pregnancies; premature birth resulted in 
impairment.  During this case, the following was argued: “[B]ut for the prescription of the 
fertility drug, these two children would not have been born.  It is impossible to restore these 
children to a position they would have been in, i.e., non-existence, but for the negligence” (p. 
3.1).  This argument is a recurring theme in wrongful life cases. 
In the wrongful birth suit R.H. v. Hunter, [1996] O.J. No. 4477 (Gen. Div.), brought 
before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, physicians were found to be negligent for failing to 
refer the plaintiff to genetic counselling.  The court ruled in favour of the parents, and they were 
awarded $3 million.  This money was allocated in the following way: general damages, awarded 
to both parents likely for their pain and suffering; special damages, including any out-of-pocket 
expenditures; the mother’s loss of future income; and future care, including medical needs, aids 
to daily living, accommodation, transportation, education, vocational work, professional 
services, respiratory assistance, and attendant care.     
In Arndt v. Smith, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 539, brought to the Supreme Court of Canada, Carol 
Arndt sued her physician for not informing her of the impairment-related risks associated with a 
pregnant woman contracting chicken pox.  Arndt argued that had Smith “advised her of the risk 
of injury to her fetus, she would have terminated the pregnancy and avoided the costs she now 
incurs” (p. 539).  Smith contended that Arndt would have kept her baby regardless and so the 
physician should not be held responsible for the deprivation of informed choice.    
 Brought to the Supreme Court, Krangle v. Brisco, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 205, involved the 
Krangles suing their physician for the cost of care for Mervyn Krangle, who was born with 
Down syndrome.  According to the plaintiffs, Dr. Morrill had failed to advise Mrs. Krangle of 
the availability of amniocentesis, a test that would have led to a diagnosis of Down syndrome; 
had Krangle known, “she would have had an abortion” (p. 2).  The trial judge had awarded the 
Krangles for the “pain, suffering, anguish associated with his brain and his development” (p. 20) 
until Mervyn reached adulthood; the Supreme Court upheld this ruling. 
 In addition to case law, I will draw from scholars who have critically analysed wrongful 
life and wrongful birth suits in Canada and the United States.  In “The birth torts: Damages for 
wrongful birth and wrongful life” (2005) and “Wrongful life and the logic of non-existence” 
(2006), Dean Stretton acts as a proponent of these kinds of legal suits.  He presents the 
arguments found in the disability critique and aims to dismantle those arguments.  He thus 
represents the most formidable objections to my position.   
With the exception of Stretton, the secondary literature used in this article is 
predominantly written by disability scholars.  These scholars give voice to the implications that 
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wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have for persons with disabilities.  Carol Thomas (1999) 
sets the scene in so far as she describes disability as social in Female Forms: Experiencing and 
Understanding Disability.  While Thomas does not specifically address legal suits, her work is 
important to include here because she reinforces the definition of disability that I use in my 
arguments.  In “Courts and wrongful birth: Can disability itself be viewed as a legal wrong?”, 
Lori B. Andrews and Michelle Hibbert (2000) ask whether the push to remediate impairment can 
be discriminatory.  Richard Hull (2006) further argues in “Cheap listening? – Reflections of the 
concept of wrongful disability” that these suits pathologize and individualize disability, thereby 
stymieing efforts to address systemic disabling conditions in our social context.   
In more complex arguments, Darpana Sheth (2006) and Wendy F. Hensel (2005) both 
explore the defense that wrongful birth promotes reproductive autonomy.  They demonstrate that 
autonomy is actually constrained in ableist contexts, and, far from promoting freedom, these 
cases justify disability discrimination.  I will be drawing from Hensel’s “The disabling impact of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions” especially when building my case against wrongful life 
and wrongful birth arguments.    
 
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Suits: Promoting the  
Devaluation of Life with Disability 
The Problem with Wrongful Life Suits 
According to disability rights advocates, wrongful life suits are predicated on the devaluation of 
life with disability – that non-existence is preferable to life with disability – an admission that 
must be made by the child born with disabilities.  If not for the failure of the physicians to inform 
parents, the pregnancy would have been terminated and the child would not have been born.  The 
injury is therefore the life with disability.  The alternative, had there been no injury, would be 
non-existence, the termination of a pregnancy.  Hensel describes the wrongful life argument in 
the following way: “[W]rongful life actions have been initiated in the impaired child's name. 
Because the alleged negligence did not actually cause the child's impairment, but instead enabled 
the child to come into being, the operable injury is the child's life itself, with non-existence 
identified as the preferred alternative” (2005: 143). 
 Hensel goes on to argue that wrongful life suits tend to be less successful than wrongful 
birth suits because “in part … courts have found it more palatable to identify lost parental choice 
as the injury than to answer the metaphysical question of whether non-existence is ever 
preferable to life, however burdened” (143). 
 Granted, in McDonald-Wright v. O’Herlihy, the case built on behalf of Beau McDonald 
involved the denial that non-existence is preferable to life with disability.  The plaintiff instead 
meant to claim damages for the costs involved in living with a disability.  This case was ruled 
against, however, and would thus not serve as a compelling precedent for plaintiffs in the future 
who wish to claim wrongful life.  Indeed, the defendants countered that wrongful life claims are 
impossible without first positing that the birth ought not to have happened, indeed that 
termination is preferable.     
 The injury would be life itself; physicians are injurious to the extent that they caused, 
through failure to disclose information, the birth and life of someone with a disability (Hensel 
2005).  In these cases, physicians did not cause the disability, for they were not directly 
responsible for the impairment-related risks associated with chicken pox or fertility drugs.  
Therefore, the only way the impairment could have been prevented would be if informed parents 
opted for abortions.     
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 It is perhaps important to note that plaintiffs in wrongful life suits are seeking 
compensation for the damages done to them as a result of being born, and these damages involve 
the pricey cost of care.  Successful wrongful life cases focus less on the claim that non-existence 
is preferable to life with disability (a claim they argue is justification for the dismissal of many 
cases) and more on “awarding damages for the child with the disability” (Andrews and Hibbert 
2000: 422).  Disability so often results in economic loss that wrongful life suits might serve as a 
remedial mechanism.   
Nonetheless, it may be problematic to seek monetary compensation from physicians for 
the costs incurred on the basis of having a disability.  According to disability rights advocates’ 
social model, disability ought to be understood not as an individual feature but instead as a range 
of barriers that prevent persons from fully functioning.  That is, disability ought to be understood 
according to how social contexts fail to respect difference (Thomas 1999).  The injuries 
associated with disability would not exist if not for social, economic, physical, and attitudinal 
barriers.  Persons with disabilities might thus be seeking justice in the wrong place; instead of 
blaming physicians and demanding monetary compensation for their cost of care, they should 
perhaps demand the redress of the failure on the part of institutions in their lives to provide 
adequate accommodations.  Hull echoes my argument: “[S]ocial policy should be directed at 
tackling the processes and conditions that give rise to cycles of deprivation and experiences of 
radically unequal life changes rather than penalizing those who happen to be unfortunate enough 
to find themselves victim to such processes and conditions (2006: 56, emphasis in the original).   
Stretton (2005, 2006) argues that sometimes non-existence is preferable to certain kinds 
of life.  People who are tortured, for instance, might in those moments prefer death.  If we 
acquiesce to this point, we ought to consider whether we fail to recognize nuances to disability 
when we dismiss the claim that non-existence is preferable to life with disability.  Indeed, 
because systemic barriers exist, life is not easy for persons, for example, with mobility-related 
devices or who are dependent on social support.  Even when not taking into account the social 
structures that disable people, impairments themselves might require scrutiny, such as when 
impairments lead to severe pain or early death. 
While I concede to the possibility that some conditions render non-existence preferable to 
life, I nevertheless stop short of arguing that non-existence is preferable to life with disability, 
even when the disability is severe.  It is important to assess specific and severe disabilities, but 
this exercise runs the risk of drawing lines in the sand, of ranking and ordering which disabilities 
ought to be valued as neutral difference and which ought to be treated as deviation.  The 
conclusion that non-existence is preferable stems from long-standing negative attitudes towards 
disability, for such a conclusion presupposes that a life can be solely constituted of 
ability/disability.  The determination that life with disability is not worth living fails to account 
for the myriad other aspects to living; people with disabilities still have families, friendships, 
goals, talents, educations, careers, romance, and so forth.  A failure to acknowledge everything 
that constitutes a life indicates that statements found in wrongful life suits are steeped in 
stereotypes and erroneous assumptions about what life with disability is like, and so those 
involved in wrongful life suits should not be in the position to make value judgments about what 
such a life entails.  Therefore, wrongful life cases only serve to reinforce negative attitudes and 
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The Problem with Wrongful Birth Suits 
In the spirit of McDonald-Wright v. O’Herlihy, I intend to establish separate arguments for 
wrongful life and wrongful birth suits.  The injury incurred in wrongful birth suits is sometimes 
referred to in the literature as the deprivation of choice.  Parents argue that they were unable to 
make fully informed decisions due to their physicians’ failure to provide sufficient medical 
advice.  In other words, patients were unable to make informed decisions regarding their 
pregnancies because they were not equipped with important information that would weigh on the 
decision.   
Parents must also argue that they would have terminated their pregnancies if they had 
been fully informed.  When Arndt v. Smith reached the Supreme Court, the crucial question 
examined was whether Arndt would have terminated her pregnancy had she been informed of the 
availability of testing that would have identified genetic impairment.  She lost her case because 
the trial judge, and later the judges presiding at the Supreme Court, determined that she would 
not have followed through with an abortion even if she had known about her child’s diagnosis of 
impairment.  The arguments made in Arndt v. Smith demonstrate that the mother’s informed 
decision to terminate pregnancy is a necessary criterion to satisfy in order to justify wrongful 
birth: “wrongful birth and wrongful life claims do not compensate every individual who is 
deprived of the ability to make an ‘informed’ reproductive choice” (Sheth 2006: 666).  That is, 
the deprivation of informed choice is not the basis for wrongful birth claims, because a plaintiff 
must also argue that had she been fully informed, she would have opted for an abortion.     
 Therefore, the harm caused by physicians in wrongful birth suits is the child born, not the 
deprivation of informed choice.  Indeed, according to Hensel, “The misleading rhetoric of choice 
and opportunity has allowed the tort of wrongful birth to garner widespread legal recognition” 
(2005: 167) even though choice is not entirely the issue.  She goes on, “[I]t is not lost choice in 
the abstract that is actionable, but the lost opportunity to abort the impaired child or to prevent 
conception.”  If the harm were simply the lack of reproductive choice, then it would not matter 
what the choice was.  Therefore, the injury done to parents is that they had an infant with 
disabilities; they are seeking compensation for having such an infant in their lives. 
In this light, the infant born is understood to be a burden.  I presented the social model of 
disability and how this model unearths societal attitudes about human variation.  In Hensel’s 
words, “Rather than focusing on the inherent physiological limitations of individuals, this model 
emphasizes social forces in constructing the experience of disability” (2005: 147).  In wrongful 
birth suits, life with disability is regarded not only as a personal tragedy but also as a burden that 
parents must shoulder.  That parents must express regret for having their child indicates that they 
are suffering for having in their lives a child with disabilities.  The social model of disability 
makes clear that the tendency to attribute the language of burden to disability is a function of 
discriminatory attitudes towards difference and furthermore is a tendency that does not properly 
account for the ways in which disability is a structural problem rather than an individual lacking.  
However, disability does involve social barriers, and, as long as those social barriers 
exist, parents contend with at least the burden of having to pay for accessibility accommodations 
and medical care.  In R.H. v. Hunter, the cost of care, amounting to $3 million, was extensive.  
As long as we do not live in a utopia where difference would be respected and systemic injustice 
would be redressed, perhaps there is a place for wrongful birth suits, one might argue.   
I would hold, however, that while wrongful birth suits might fill a gap that has yet to be 
solved, they are nevertheless problematic because they only serve to compensate parents who are 
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willing to identify their children as unwanted injuries.  According to Hensel, “No matter how 
compelling the need … no assistance will be extended to the family who would have chosen to 
embrace or simply accept the impaired child prior to his birth” (2005: 172).  She continues, 
“[A]ssistance is provided only to those willing to openly disavow their self-worth and dignity” 
(177).  For disability rights scholars, suits of this nature involve the devaluation of persons with 
disabilities in order for parents to qualify for funds.  Parents like Arndt, who would choose to 
have their children despite the disabilities involved, are not entitled to compensation.  Therefore, 
they are left in the cold, left to deal with the cost of care themselves.   
Krangle v. Brisco involves the question of whose burden Mervyn will become, even well 
into adulthood, and such a question presupposes that the problem of disability is still meant to be 
solved at the individual level.  However, there would no longer be a need to assign blame, nor to 
demand compensation, if our social context no longer disabled people on the basis of difference.  
Wrongful birth is problematic to the extent that parents can only qualify for compensation when 
they identify their children as injuries.  Due to systemic injustice, they are put into a position 
where they must call their children burdens in order to afford the cost of care.  People with 
disabilities and their parents ought to qualify for financial support on the basis of human rights, 
on the basis of equality, rather than because disability is a legal injury.   
 
Conclusion 
I have sought to demonstrate that the value judgments made in wrongful life and wrongful birth 
suits have implications for the disability community.  By affirming the parents’ rights to 
discriminate against disability, courts in effect justify disability discrimination (Sheth 2006).  
Legal tort laws can only entail language of injury in so far as people are understood as being less 
than the standard of normalcy or health.  Disability comes to be seen as an injury, something 
located in the individual, and something for which someone ought to be held at fault. 
 Yes, accommodations are costly, and tort law provides a way for unprepared parents to 
seek compensation and support.  They would have support, however, if social structures and 
policies created a context whereby difference was treated with respect and the equality rights to 
which people are entitled were honoured.  Wrongful life and wrongful birth suits do more than 
simply fill in a gap left by systemic injustice.  Suits of this nature force disabled people and their 
parents into corners, force them to take up the language of harm and to identify disability as a 
burden or a tragedy in order to qualify for funding.  Furthermore, the process of laying the blame 
only localizes disability in the individual, rendering disability a problem for individuals to solve 
rather than a human rights issue that is the state’s responsibility to address.  Wrongful life and 
wrongful birth suits are not simply a necessary evil for seeking compensation in a society that 
does not accommodate diversity.  Rather, these suits are further contributing to discrimination 
against persons with disabilities by associating disability with harm and by rendering disability a 
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